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Pension de-risking strategies have been widely adopted by firms with defined-benefit (DB)
pension plans to reduce pension risk. This paper investigates the influence of board com-
position on pension de-risking strategies within the UK, focusing particularly on three
strategies: changes to pension asset allocations, switches fromDB to defined-contribution
(DC) pension plans and pension buy-ins and buy-outs. Our findings suggest that firms
with larger boards and more independent directors are less likely to invest their pension
assets in equities. Survival analysis shows that firms with larger boards are slower to
switch from DB to DC pension plans. This is consistent with stakeholder theory, in that
firms with large boards or more independent directors are more likely to protect employ-
ees’ benefits when de-risking their DB pension plans. However, firms with more female
directors are faster to switch fully from DB to DC pension plans and slower to engage in
pension buy-in and buy-out transactions. This suggests that female directors encourage
fully switching DB pension plans, while they are concerned with the significant costs of
pension buy-in or buy-out. This research provides clear evidence that pension de-risking
strategies are influenced by board composition. UK pension trustees play a key role in de-
termining switches from DB to DC pension plans, mitigating the impact of independent
directors.
Introduction
At the end of 2018, the aggregate pension fund-
ing level of FTSE 100 firms saw a surplus follow-
ing large pension contributions and implementa-
tion of various pension de-risking strategies (Lane
Clark & Peacock, 2019). With regard to DB pen-
sion plans, firms are generally responsible for en-
suring that future pension benefits are achieved.
Thus, DB pension plans pose a high level of risk
and uncertainty for employers, and many firms
with DB pension plans have embarked on pension
de-risking strategies in order to reduce the risk of
such plans to these firms. Lane Clark & Peacock
(2014) suggest that FTSE 100 firms’ pension as-
sets will continue to be re-allocated from equities
to bonds, indicating that firms are investing in safer
assets to lower their pension fund risk. Since the
2000s, FTSE 100 firms have been forced to close
their DB pension plans to either new or all em-
ployees due to rising uncertainty and anticipated
costs (Lane Clark & Peacock, 2014). For exam-
ple, in 2015, Severn Trent and Standard Life an-
nounced the closure of their DB pension plans to
new employees, and HSBC has closed its DB pen-
sion plan to existing members. Firms can not only
choose these traditional pension de-risking strate-
gies, but may also pay insurance premiums to enter
pension buy-in or buy-out contracts. This new fi-
nancial tool allows firms to reduce or remove pen-
sion obligations risk by transferring it to an insur-
ance firm. This study therefore focuses on three
pension de-risking strategies: changes to pension
asset allocations, switches fromDB to DC pension
plans (partial or full switches) and pension buy-ins
and buy-outs (BIOs).
However, the three pension de-risking strate-
gies have significantly differing consequences for
employees and firms (see Appendix A in the on-
line Supporting Information). Firms invest higher
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proportions of pension assets in equities to en-
able them to reduce pension contributions (Bodie,
1990), while investing pension assets in bonds
can match the duration of pension liabilities and
asset allocations in order to mitigate volatility
in DB pension plan funding (Blake, 2001). Par-
tial and full switching from DB pension plans
passes investment, longevity and other associated
risks from employers to employees (Broadbent,
Palumbo and Woodman, 2006). Ippolito (1995,
1997), Munnell et al. (2007) and VanDerhei (2006)
suggest that switching from DB to DC pension
plans allows firms to cut employees’ retirement
benefits. Firms can engage in BIOs by paying an in-
surance premium. Pension BIOs reduce, but – de-
pending on the amount of funding provided – do
not eliminate risk to the firm, since the financial
position of the pension fund has to be kept un-
der review and remains the sponsor’s responsibil-
ity. Overall, switches fromDB toDCpension plans
impact on pension beneficiaries more significantly
and directly than changes to pension asset alloca-
tions. Of the three pension de-risking strategies,
pension BIOs are the most costly financial tools
to reduce firms’ pension obligations owing to their
up-front costs.
Top management and boards of directors
can significantly influence pension policy-making
(Cocco and Volpin, 2007; Vafeas and Vlittis, 2016,
2018). Themajority of the literature focuses onDB
pension plans for US firms. However, UK pension
trustees are responsible for managing and making
investment decisions onDB pension plans (Thorn-
ton and Fleming, 2011), and are expected to act
in the best interests of pension beneficiaries. The
UK Pensions Regulator has changed the pension
regulations to strengthen pension trustees’ inde-
pendence with regard to pension policy-making
and investment strategies. Thus, we investigate and
compare differing impacts of board composition –
namely board size, percentage of independent and
female directors on the boards – on the three pen-
sion de-risking strategies in the UK.
This study provides evidence to support stake-
holder theory, in that larger andmore independent
boards are less likely to make risky investment de-
cisions. Also, large boards are more likely to re-
tain DB pension plans for their employees. We find
no evidence that board independence impacts on
switching decisions, unlike in the USA (Vafeas and
Vlittis, 2018); however, as we explain, UK pension
trustees mitigate the effect of independent direc-
tors. Survival analysis differentiates the impact of
partial and full switching on employees and firms.
Our evidence also shows that higher percentages of
female directors encourage full switches from DB
to DC pension plans to reduce firms’ pension risk.
In addition, we are the first study to investigate the
impact of board composition on innovative pen-
sion de-risking strategies, in particular BIOs. We
report that firms with a high percentage of female
directors are also slower to engage in BIOs. This is
because female directors weigh the up-front costs
of BIOs against the benefits of insuring DB pen-
sion plans.
This research makes several contributions to the
literature. First, it is the first to explore the im-
pact of board compositions on different de-risking
strategies in the UK pensions setting, where UK
pension trustees play a significant role in pension
policy-making. Second, we contribute to the cor-
porate governance literature by exploring the ef-
fects of boards of directors, independent directors
and female directors on the pension setting. Third,
previous research has not comprehensively exam-
ined different pension de-risking strategies, and we
incorporate an innovative pension de-risking strat-
egy – BIOs – and apply survival analysis. This pa-
per also contributes to the pension de-risking strat-
egy literature by showing how firms’board compo-
sition affects pension policy-making when there is
a need to reduce pension risk. Finally, our results
may be applicable to other countries with similar
pension governance bodies to the UK, such as Eu-
rope, Canada and Ireland.
The remainder of this paper is structured as fol-
lows. The next section discusses previous litera-
ture on board composition and pension de-risking
strategies. The third section develops hypotheses,
and the fourth section describes the sample selec-
tion process and the empirical model. The main
tests and results are analysed in the fifth section,
and the final section draws some conclusions.
Corporate governance and pension
de-risking strategies
Board composition and corporate pension policy
Previous research on the relationship between cor-
porate governance and corporate pension policy
(Anantharaman and Lee, 2014; Guan and Tang,
2018; Phan and Hegde, 2013; Vafeas and Vlittis,
2016, 2018; Yu-Thompson et al., 2015) has been
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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based on US data. Phan and Hegde (2013) find
that firms with better internal and external corpo-
rate governance index tend to allocate more pen-
sion assets to equities. This indicates that risk-
increasing strategies for pension asset allocations
are driven primarily by a desire to achieve higher
returns on pension assets, better pension plan
funding levels and greater reductions in future pen-
sion contributions.
Pension investment strategies may be driven by
the interests of top management in US firms.
Vafeas and Vlittis (2016) find that independent di-
rectors play a key role in determining pension poli-
cies. A higher proportion of independent direc-
tors relates to better pension funding levels and
lower pension asset allocations to equities. They
suggest that independent directors adhere to their
fiduciary responsibility to forward pension benefi-
ciaries under the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act in the USA. However, Vafeas and Vlit-
tis (2018) suggest that independent directors’ inter-
ests are in line with shareholders’ interests in max-
imizing firm value by closing DB pension plans to
employees. They also provide evidence that firms
with a higher proportion of independent directors
are more likely to close their DB pension plans.
This adds to the puzzle of why independent direc-
tors act differently towards pension policy-making
in relation to allocating pension assets and closing
DB pension plans. In addition, long-term invest-
ments in equities may outperform investments in
bonds. Therefore, it is argued that allocating fewer
pension assets to equities may not reduce pension
beneficiaries’ risk, as it increases the risk of not
meeting future benefits obligations.
There is limited evidence on UK DB pensions
in relation to firms’ board compositions and pen-
sion de-risking strategies within this institutional
setting. The legal forms of pension funds differ
between countries. The term ‘trustee’ is used in
Anglo-Saxon countries, where pension funds are
established under trust law and trust deed. There-
fore, pension trustees are found in the UK, Ireland
and Canada. UK pension trustees have fiduciary
responsibility for managing DB pension plans and
making decisions on pension policy (Tilba and
McNulty, 2013). They are required to work in-
dependently and act in the interests of pension
beneficiaries. Thus, pension plan governance and
trustee independence may determine the likeli-
hood that companies will be able to engineer re-
allocations of pension plan assets. However, the
USA has an additional feature, as pension gov-
ernance bodies are commonly sponsoring firms.
Cocco and Volpin (2007) provide UK evidence
and find that a higher proportion of trustees who
are board members of sponsoring firms encourage
higher pension asset allocations to equities. They
suggest that pension trustees play a significant role
in decision-making with regard to pension invest-
ment strategies. In addition, firms need to consult
with the pension trustees if they are planning to
make significant changes to the pension funds.
Pension de-risking strategies
Changes in pension asset allocations. Pension in-
vestment strategies determine returns on pension
assets, and consequently influence pension fund-
ing levels and pension risk where rates of, and vari-
ability in, returns vary for different asset classes.
Therefore, sponsoring firms tend to alter their pen-
sion asset allocations to mitigate pension risk.
Lane Clark & Peacock (2014, 2015) indicate that
firms have shifted their pension asset allocations
from equities to bonds to mitigate pension risk
arising from recent changes in accounting stan-
dards and financial crises. Similarly, Amir and Be-
nartzi (1999) reveal that UK and US firms have
tended to re-allocate pension assets from equities
to bonds as a result of adopting IAS 19 and SFAS
158. Mashruwala (2008) provides evidence from
theUK that, following the implementation of FRS
17, pension asset allocations have shifted from eq-
uities to bonds. Holt (2011) confirms that these
shifts were due to the adoption of a new pension
accounting standard and increasing pension risk.
Therefore, Amir and Benartzi (1999) recommend
that firms should allocate pension assets to fixed-
income securities in order to match pension assets
with the duration of pension liabilities. Overall,
allocating pension assets to fixed-income securi-
ties may reduce volatility in pension contributions
(Bader and Leibowitz, 1988).
However, firms may pursue higher returns from
pension investments by allocating pension assets to
equities. Investments in equity markets are likely
to outperform the bond market in the long term.
It can also be argued that allocating pension as-
sets to equities will be more appropriate for firms
with longer durations of pension liabilities, as
they have longer time horizons and are more able
to capture the ‘equity premium’. Successful pen-
sion investments in equities may benefit firms by
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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lowering pension contributions from sponsoring
firms (Bodie, 1990). Liu and Tonks (2013) find
a negative relationship between pension contribu-
tions and dividend payments. They indicate that
pension contributions crowd out or reduce divi-
dend payments to shareholders. Therefore, firms
with higher pension asset allocations to equities
are expected to have higher investment returns,
thereby reducing pension contributions and main-
taining levels of dividend payments. In general,
changes in pension asset allocations are regarded
as pension de-risking strategies.
Switches fromDB to DC pension plans. Increased
pension contributions and costs have led sponsor-
ing firms to switch from DB to DC pension plans
(Clark and Monk, 2007). DC pension plans offer
an option to transfer risk from employers to em-
ployees. Switches from DB pension plans are re-
garded as a key pension de-risking strategy in this
research. The UK Pensions Regulator (2016) re-
ports that the proportion of members in open DB
pension plans declined sharply from 66% to 19%
between 2006 and 2016, while the percentage of
DB pension plans remaining open to all employ-
ees dropped from 43% in 2006 to 13% in 2016. This
shows that UK companies are de-risking their DB
pension plans by stopping accruals of benefits to
new or all employees.
There are two types of switches from DB to DC
pension plans. In partial switching, new employees
are unable to join the DB pension plan, while ex-
isting employees currently in such plans continue
to earn benefits as usual (Munnell et al., 2007).
In place of DB pension plans for new employees,
sponsoring firms tend to offer DC pension plans.
Thus, another type of switching is to close a DB
pension plan to all employees. This means that the
value of pension benefits will stop increasing af-
ter the date of the switch. Rauh, Stefanescu and
Zeldes (2017) find that switches from DB to DC
pension plans help sponsoring firms make sub-
stantial savings. Dobbins and Dundon (2017) sug-
gest that switching will reduce pension benefits
to employees. Other studies (Choy, Lin and Offi-
cer, 2014; Comprix and Muller, 2011; McFarland,
Pang and Warshawsky, 2009; Milevsky and Song,
2010) find that full switching of DB pension plans
impacts on US firms’ risk.
Pension buy-ins and buy-outs. Pension buy-ins
and buy-outs provide an opportunity for firms to
remove the responsibility for paying pension ben-
efits partially or fully by means of a contract with
an insurance company. There are differences be-
tween pension buy-ins and buy-outs. Through a
buy-in policy, the sponsor firm purchases a group
annuity, based on a valuation of future obliga-
tions, which is held as an asset within the pension
fund (D’Amato et al., 2018). The insurance com-
pany makes regular payments to pension trustees
tomatch the pension benefits required to be paid to
the relevant former employees. However, the pen-
sion scheme continues to administer the benefit
payments and the sponsor firm retains responsibil-
ity in the event of default by the insurance com-
pany. Buy-ins have been popular in the UK, but
less so in the USA, where the buy-out is more fa-
miliar (Geddes et al., 2014). Pension buy-out was
originally used to transfer the pension assets and li-
abilities of insolvent employers. With a full or par-
tial pension buy-out, a firm transfers all or some
of its pension obligations, along with associated
assets, to insurers. If a firm completes a full buy-
out, on a one-off or phased basis, the DB pension
obligations are entirely removed from its financial
statements. A firm may choose to engage in a pen-
sion buy-in or a partial or full pension buy-out ac-
cording to its desired level of reduction in pension
obligations and its particular circumstances.1 Lin,
MacMinn andTian (2015), however, highlight that
sponsoring firms are required to pay a significant
amount of premium to enter a pension buy-in or
buy-out insurance.
Since the market is relatively new and data
on transactions are limited, there is little empir-
ical literature focusing on pension buy-ins and
buy-outs. Given that the longevity risk is one of
the largest pension risks faced by DB pension
plans (Tilba and Wilson, 2017), other research
(Biffis and Blake, 2009; Blake et al., 2008) explores
pension buy-ins and buy-outs to investigate how
1Lane Clark & Peacock (2018) reports different types of
pension buy-in and buy-out transactions: pensioner buy-
in, full buy-out, pensioner buy-out and buy-in. The pen-
sioner buy-in (buy-out) is defined as a buy-in (buy-out)
that covers payments to current pensioners and their de-
pendents. Full pension buy-out is a buy-out contract cov-
ering all known liabilities in a pension plan, usually fol-
lowed by winding up the pension plan. Buy-in represents
a purchase of a bulk annuity contract with an insurance
company as an investment to match some or all of a pen-
sion plan’s liabilities. This research does not take account
of different types of pension buy-in and buy-out con-
tracts.
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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employers transfer mortality risk to insurance
companies via this insurance contract.
Hypothesis development
Boards of directors make top-level decisions and
oversee firms’operations (Fama and Jensen, 1983),
and DB pension de-risking is an important area
of firms’ strategic decision-making. Prior litera-
ture (Cocco and Volpin, 2007; Vafeas and Vlittis,
2016, 2018) suggests that independent directors in-
fluence pension policy-making, including changes
in pension asset allocations and closures of DB
pension plans. Thus, boards of directors are also
likely to be associated with any decisions to initi-
ate pension de-risking strategies in order to reduce
or remove pension obligation risk.
Effect of board size on pension de-risking strategies
US empirical studies collectively suggest that large
boards tend to make less risky investment deci-
sions (Pathan, 2009; Wang, 2012). Cheng (2008)
finds that board size is negatively related to a
firm’s performance, supporting the argument that
large boards tend to make more compromises to
reach less extreme decisions. A questionnaire sur-
vey (McNulty, Florackis and Ormrod, 2013) also
provides evidence of a negative relationship be-
tween board size and financial risk of UK firms.
Studies in the field of economics and psychology
(Kogan and Wallach, 1966; Moscovici and Zaval-
loni, 1969; Sah and Stiglitz, 1986, 1991) provide
perspectives on how boards of directors make de-
cisions. Given that directors generally hold diverse
opinions and have differing abilities to process in-
formation, risky projects are more likely to be re-
jected. Final decisions represent averages and com-
promises on group members’ opinions.
Phan and Hegde (2013) find that US firms with
better corporate governance index are more likely
to allocate pension assets to equities. However,
prior literature reaches no clear conclusion on the
effect of board size on pension asset allocations. In
addition, successful pension investments in equi-
ties may reduce the pension contributions of spon-
soring firms (Bodie, 1990). Franzen (2010) sug-
gests that sponsoring firms benefit from contribu-
tion holidays if there are higher returns on pension
investments. According to agency theory, boards
of directors are expected to maximize the interests
of shareholders. If large boards result in less firm
risk for the benefits of shareholders, they are also
likely to be positively related to equity investments
in the pension setting. However, investing pension
assets in bonds can match between the duration
of pension liabilities and asset allocations in or-
der to mitigate volatility in DB pension plan fund-
ing (Blake, 2001). Thus, boards of directors may
choose to invest pension assets in bonds to gen-
erate more secure pension benefits for employees
and reduce investment risks of the pension plans.
Stakeholder theory suggests that boards of direc-
tors should consider the interests of employees. If
large boards result in less risk for employees and
pension plans, then they are also expected to be
negatively related to equity investments. The above
discussion leads to a non-directional hypothesis re-
lating to board size and pension asset allocations:
H1a: There is a significant relationship between
board size and the percentage of pension assets
invested in equities.
Boards of directors can influence the decision
to switch from DB to DC pension plans in or-
der to reduce risk. Large boards favour less risk-
taking practices and are negatively related to firms’
financial risk (Cheng, 2008; Pathan, 2009; Wang,
2012). Again, prior literature provides inconclu-
sive evidence on the impact of board size on the
switch decision of pension plans. Rauh, Stefanescu
and Zeldes (2017) suggest that reducing employ-
ees’ pension benefits can save firms money. They
find that firms which freeze their DB plans tend to
make cost savings of 2–3% of payroll per annum,
and in the long run save about 3% of total firm
assets. Munnell et al. (2007) suggest that motives
for firms switching fromDB pension plans include
reducing future retirement benefits, cutting health-
care costs and avoiding the risks of accounting and
regulatory changes. Given the cost-saving incen-
tive, the agency view of boards of directors sug-
gests that they may pursue cost reductions for the
benefit of shareholders. Thus, it is expected that
larger boards have greater incentive to reduce pen-
sion costs, and consequently reduce pension liabil-
ity risks.
However, Choy, Lin and Officer (2014) find that
firms’ risk increases in terms of operating ac-
tivities, research and development and financing
strategies following full switches from DB to DC.
Hence, firms are likely to take onmore risk if man-
agers are compensated through equity-like rather
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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than debt-like incentive mechanisms. In addition,
McFarland, Pang and Warshawsky (2009) suggest
that it is unclear whether switching from DB to
DC pension plans can reduce firms’ pension costs,
as they must facilitate new pension plans for em-
ployees. Switches have a negative effect on human
resources, as they significantly reduce employees’
benefits. In contrast to the agency view of direc-
tors, boards of directors must take account of em-
ployees’ benefits. The costs of switching may out-
weigh the benefits, and partial switching from DB
to DC may increase firm risk, because it may lead
to an increase in firms’ costs of providing DB pen-
sions to existing members, as fewer younger em-
ployees will be contributing to the plan. We thus
develop our second non-directional hypothesis:
H1b: There is a significant relationship between
board size and the time taken for firms to switch
from DB to DC pension plans.
Pension BIOs are innovative financial tools to
help firms offload pension liabilities to insurance
companies. Unlike the switching decisions, pen-
sion BIOs can entail significant insurance premi-
ums. Firms can remove pension obligations from
their financial statements only through pension
buy-outs. Lin, MacMinn and Tian (2015) suggest
that a careful consideration of firms’ financial po-
sition is needed before engaging in such insurance
contracts. Given that employees’ benefits are se-
cured under BIO contracts, boards of directors
must take account of the costs of such de-risking
strategies. Thus, we argue that firms may have less
incentive to engage in pension BIOs owing to the
costs of insurance.
H1c: There is a significant negative relationship be-
tween board size and the time taken by firms to
engage in pension buy-ins or buy-outs.
Effect of board independence on pension de-risking
strategies
Vafeas and Vlittis (2016) suggest that indepen-
dent directors encourage lower pension asset in-
vestments in equities when firms are close to going
bankrupt in the USA. They argue that inside and
outside directors pursue different interests in pen-
sion policy-making. Although boards of directors
are committed to serving shareholders and pen-
sion plan beneficiaries, the interests of inside di-
rectors aremore alignedwith shareholders’wealth,
whereas outside directors are more likely to act to-
wards pension plan beneficiaries. In addition, the
FCA (2020) requires firms operating workplace
pension schemes to establish and maintain inde-
pendent governance committees (IGCs). These in-
fluence pension investment policies. According to
stakeholder theory, since firms that allocate fewer
pension assets to equities are more likely to pro-
vide less volatile and more secured pension bene-
fits to their employees, lower allocations of pen-
sion assets to equities are expected to relate to hav-
ing more independent directors on boards.
H2a: There is a negative relationship between
board independence and the percentage of pen-
sion assets invested in equities.
In contrast, Vafeas and Vlittis (2018) provide
evidence that a higher proportion of independent
directors relates to a greater likelihood of firms
switching from DB to DC plans. Their findings
suggest that independent directors’ interests are
more aligned with shareholders than pension ben-
eficiaries with regard to pension obligations. As
previously discussed, firms benefit from switching
through cost reductions and risk-shifting from em-
ployers to employees (Broadbent, Palumbo and
Woodman, 2006; Ippolito, 1995, 1997; Munnell
et al., 2007; Rauh, Stefanescu and Zeldes, 2017).
However, there are institutional differences be-
tween UK and US DB pension plans. Munnell
et al. (2007) suggest that decisions to switch from
DB pension plans are determined entirely by firms
in the USA. However, labour unions may oppose
reductions to employees’ benefits. In the UK, the
Pensions Regulator requires firms to consult with
pension trustees to agree on significant changes to
DB pension plans. Therefore, pension trustees play
a key role in switching decisions and are expected
to safeguard pension beneficiaries’ interests when
sponsoring firms decide to switch from DB pen-
sion plans.
H2b: There is a negative or no relationship between
board independence and the time taken for firms
to switch from DB to DC pension plans.
There is limited research on the impact of board
independence on pension BIO decisions. As previ-
ously discussed, firms can benefit from removing
pension obligations from financial statements after
engaging in pension buy-outs. However, the costs
of insurance premiums are a major concern. It
is unclear whether independent directors are
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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interested in removing pension obligations
through pension BIOs, and whether insurance
premium costs outweigh re-insuring pension
obligations. Thus, we hypothesize:
H2c: There is a significant relationship between
board independence and the time taken for firms
to engage in pension buy-ins or buy-outs.
Effect of female board members on pension
de-risking strategies
Adams and Ferreira (2009) suggest that female di-
rectors’ behaviour tends to differ significantly from
male directors’ behaviour in terms of monitoring
and the impact on firm performance. In particu-
lar, females are on average more risk-averse than
males (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). For example,
Faccio, Marchica and Mura (2016) find that a fe-
male CEO is associated with a reduction in cor-
porate risk-taking (measured by leverage, return
on assets and volatility returns). Similarly, Palvia,
Vähämaa and Vähämaa (2015) report that firms
with female CEOs and board chairs assess risk
more conservatively, hold less equity capital and
engage in less risky operations thanmales. Prior lit-
erature provides limited evidence on the impact of
female directors on pension investment decisions.
Pension investment decisions are made by boards
of directors and pension trustees in the UK, pre-
senting the collective view of directors, including
female directors. Thus, female directors may in-
fluence pension asset allocations. Given that fe-
male directors are more risk-averse (Croson and
Gneezy, 2009) and make less risky investment de-
cisions (Faccio, Marchica and Mura, 2016) than
their male counterparts, firms with more female
directors are expected to be less likely to allocate
pension assets to equities.
H3a: There is a negative relationship between the
percentage of female directors on boards and the
percentage of pension assets invested in equities.
Research on the impact of female directors
on pension benefits is limited. Vafeas and Vlittis
(2018) use the percentage of female directors as
a control variable, but find no significant relation-
ship with decisions to switch fromDB toDCplans.
DB pension plans pose a great risk to firms. Prior
literature suggests that firms can make substan-
tial cost savings by switching from DB to DC pen-
sion plans (Munnell et al., 2007; Rauh, Stefanescu
and Zeldes, 2017). Given that female directors are
more risk-averse than male directors (Croson and
Gneezy, 2009), they have greater incentives to de-
risk DB pension plans. Hence, firms with more
female directors are more likely to switch from
DB to DC pension plans to reduce firms’ pension
risk. However, Choy, Lin and Officer (2014) find
that switching from DB to DC pension plans in-
creases managerial risk and induces managers to
take more risk, thus increasing overall firm risk.
Firms withmore female directors are therefore less
likely to switch from DB to DC. We develop the
following non-directional hypothesis:
H3b: There is a significant relationship between the
percentage of female directors on boards and the
time taken for firms to switch from DB to DC
pension plans.
The impact of female directors on boards on
pension BIO decisions has not previously been
explored. Female directors may also balance the
costs and benefits of such decisions. Given that
Lin, Shi and Arik (2017) suggest that implement-
ing pension BIOs may constrain firms facing poor
financial conditions, female directors may worry
about the significant costs of such actions. How-
ever, since female directors appear to be less tra-
ditional (Adams and Funk, 2012) and more risk-
averse (Croson andGneezy, 2009) thanmale direc-
tors, they may be more likely to use new financial
tools to help reduce firms’ pension obligations.
H3c: There is a significant relationship between the
percentage of female directors on boards and the
time taken by firms to engage in pension buy-ins
or buy-outs.
Sample selection and descriptive
statistics
Sample selection
This research focuses on FTSE 350 firms with DB
pension plans from 2005 to 2017. FTSE 350 firms
account for the majority of DB pension plans in
the UK. Given that de-risking DB pension plans
significantly affects firms’ operations and employ-
ees’ benefits, any such decisions must represent
the interests of both employers and employees.
Data on partial and full switches from DB to DC
pension plans are hand-collected from FTSE 350
firms’ annual reports for the period 2000–2017.
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 1. Sample selection criteria
Sample selection criteria Firm-year
observations
Unique firms Number of firms with switches or
BIOs in the sample
Initial sample for FTSE 350 during
2005–2017
4,546 650
Final sample for pension asset
allocation during 2005–2017
1,791 257









This reports the number of firms either fully switched or partially switched fromDB to DC pension plans. Note that four firms engage
in both full and part switches.
b
This includes 33 firms that engage in pension buy-ins or buy-outs.
Pension BIO information is hand-collected from a
practitioner research report2 (Lane Clark & Pea-
cock, 2018). Board composition, pension asset al-
location and other accounting information are col-
lected from the Bloomberg database, available for
the period 2005–2017. Instrumental variables are
collected from BoardEx. The sample selection cri-
teria are reported in Table 1.
The primary sample includes FTSE 350 firms
from 2005 to 2017, with unbalanced panel data for
4,546 firm-year observations and 650 unique firms.
In order to deal with survivorship bias, we allow
firms to freely exit and enter the FTSE 350 index.
We exclude firms for which no information is avail-
able on board composition data and pension as-
set allocation information, resulting in 1,791 firm-
year observations for the pension asset allocation
sample. Merging the data on switches from DB
plans and board composition results in 1,669 firm-
year observations and 291 firms. Survival analysis
allows us to deal with right-censoring of the ob-
servations. Given that firms are believed to switch
to DC plans to eventually terminate their DB pen-
sion plans, survival analysis allows us to include
FTSE 350 firms that did not switch their DB pen-
sion plans in the sampled years, but will ultimately
do so later.
Merging the data on BIOs and board composi-
tion results in 196 firm-year observations and 33
2Founded in 1947, Lane Clark & Peacock (LCP) is a ma-
jor UK-based firm of financial, actuarial and business
consultants. It is a leading provider of advice in areas
such as pensions, investments and insurance. One of its
key activities is the provision of advice to pension plan
trustees and corporate sponsors on complex UK and in-
ternational pensions issues.
Table 2. Sample split according to the partially and fully switches
of DB pension plan and BIOs
Year Partial switch Full switch BIO
2005 5 0 N/A
2006 5 4 N/A
2007 4 8 2
2008 3 2 2
2009 3 4 5
2010 1 15 2
2011 3 13 2
2012 4 9 1
2013 6 7 3
2014 4 5 5
2015 0 10 2
2016 0 8 4
2017 0 8 5
Total 38 93 33
Note: This table presents the distribution of the switches of DB
pension plans and pension buy-ins and buy-outs by year. There
are two types of switches in the sample: partial switching and
full switching from DB to DC pension plans. Partial switching
is defined as the closure of DB pension plans to new employees.
Full switching is defined as the closure of DB pension plans to all
employees. The pension buy-ins and buy-outs are not presented
separately and regarded as BIO.
unique firms. This sample only includes firms with
BIOs, a strategy for de-risking that not all firms
chose to adopt. Table 2 provides information on
the distribution of firms, partial switches (38), full
switches (93) and pension BIO transactions (33)
across the years of analysis.
Descriptive statistics
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the
explanatory and control variables used in our
empirical analyses. All continuous variables are
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Panel A: PA Panel B: SWITCH Panel C: BIO
Mean Std dev. Median Mean Std dev. Median Mean Std dev. Median
EQUITY 42.039 20.377 41.232
DUR_SWITCH 0.101 0.418 0
DUR_BIO 0.027 0.163 0
SIZE_BOARD 9.624 2.513 9 9.576 2.534 9 9.576 2.534 9
BOARD_IND 60.328 12.385 60 59.845 12.413 60 59.845 12.413 60
PCT_FEMALE 15.465 10.626 14.286 14.694 10.795 14.286 14.694 10.795 14.286
ROA 7.177 5.873 5.927 7.299 5.985 6.073 7.299 5.985 6.073
LEV 0.637 0.199 0.633 0.631 0.204 0.633 0.631 0.204 0.633
OP_CF 0.282 0.575 0.232 0.282 0.564 0.228 0.282 0.564 0.228
DIV_PAYOUT 66.832 82.504 48.947 67.046 83.299 48.256 67.046 83.299 48.256
SIZE 8.348 1.777 8 8.285 1.777 7.962 8.285 1.777 7.962
PLAN_SIZE 0.329 0.382 0.212 0.308 0.380 0.186 0.308 0.380 0.186
FUND 90.727 14.176 91.22 90.307 15.121 90.78 90.307 15.121 90.78
Note:This table reports descriptive statistics for three pension de-risking strategies (pension asset allocations (PA), switches fromDB to
DC pension plans (SWITCH) and pension buy-ins and buy-outs (BIO)), board characteristics and other control variables. Information
about switches from DB to DC are hand-collected from annual reports. Pension buy-in and buy-out data are hand-collected from a
commercial research report (Lane Clark & Peacock, 2018). Pension asset allocations and accounting information are collected from
the Bloomberg database. All continuous variables have been winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. All variable definitions are reported
in Appendix B.
winsorized (at the top and bottom 1%). More
specifically, Panel A shows the variables used
to examine the impact of board compositions
on pension asset allocations. On average, 42%
of pension assets are allocated to equities (EQ-
UITY), and there are 9.6 directors on the board
(SIZE_BOARD), 60% of whom are independent
directors (BOARD_IND) and 15.5% female di-
rectors (PCT_FEMALE). The majority of pen-
sion funds are underfunded, as the funding level
(FUND) is 91%. Panels B and C show the vari-
ables used to examine the impact of board com-
positions on switches and BIOs, respectively. The
mean of the duration variable, DUR_SWITCH,
is 0.1. The mean of DUR_BIO is 0.027 and that
of PLAN_SIZE is 0.33, suggesting that projected
benefit obligations are equal to 33% of firms’ to-
tal assets. Pairwise correlation coefficients for the
variables used are shown in Table 4. We note no
high correlations among the variables; hence, mul-
ticollinearity is not an issue in our models.
Empirical analyses and results
Impact of board composition on pension asset
allocations
In order to examine the impact of board compo-
sitions on pension asset allocations, the following
firm and industry fixed-effects model is used:
EQUITYi = β0 + β1SIZE_BOARDi,t
+ β2BOARD_INDi,t + β3PCT_FEMALEi,t
+ β4ROAi,t + β5LEVi,t + β6OP_CFi,t
+ β7DIV _PAYOUTi,t + β8SIZEi,t







The dependent variable EQUITY is a continu-
ous variable measuring the percentage of pension
assets allocated to equities. The definition of the
independent variables is given inAppendix B in the
online Supporting Information. Table 5 presents
the results of estimating Eq. (1).
There is a significant negative relationship be-
tweenSIZE_BOARD andEQUITY at the 10% sig-
nificance level. This indicates that firms with larger
boards are less likely to allocate pension assets to
equities, and are hence more likely to make less
risky pension investments. These results are con-
sistent with H1a, supporting that firms with larger
boards are less likely to take extreme decisions
(Cheng, 2008). Firms with larger boards reduce
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 5. The impact of board composition on pension asset
allocations
EQUITYi = β0 + β1SIZE_BOARDi,t
+ β2BOARD_INDi,t + β3PCT_FEMALEi,t + β4ROAi,t
+ β5LEVi,t + β6OP_CFi,t + β7DIV_PAYOUTi,t


































Note: This table reports the results of a year and industry fixed-
effects regression that examines the impact of board composition
on pension asset allocations. The dependent variable is percent-
age of pension assets allocated to equities (EQUITY). Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** rep-
resent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively (two-
tailed). Standard errors clustered by firm. All variable definitions
are reported in Appendix B.
investment risks relating to pension funds and pro-
vide secure pension benefits for their employees.
There is a negative relationship between
BOARD_IND andEQUITY at the 5% significance
level. This finding supports H2a and suggests that
firms with more independent directors on boards
are less likely to invest pension assets in risky in-
vestments. Our evidence is consistent with Vafeas
and Vlittis’s (2016) finding that outside directors
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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are more committed to protecting the interests of
pension beneficiaries. Thus, the more independent
directors, the less likely that pension assets will be
allocated to risky asset classes.
However, there is an insignificant relationship
between PCT_FEMALE and EQUITY. We find
no evidence that having more female directors on
boards encourages less risky pension investments.
Thus, H3a is rejected.
In summary, our evidence for the impact of
board composition on pension asset allocations re-
veals that firms with larger boards and more inde-
pendent directors are less likely to allocate pension
assets to equities. This finding is consistent with
stakeholder theory.
Impact of board composition on DB pension plan
switches
The following Cox proportional hazards model is
used to explore whether board composition im-
pacts the survival of DB pension plans:
hi (DUR_SWITCH ) = h0(t)exp{β0
+ β1SIZE_BOARDi,t + β2BOARD_INDi,t
+ β3PCT_FEMALEi,t + β4ROAi,t + β5LEVi,t
+ β6OP_CFi,t + β7DIV _PAYOUTi,t




βrIndustry_dummy+ σ } (2)
The dependent variable is a duration variable re-
ferring to the time taken (in years) from the start of
the sample period for the firm to switch from DB
pension plans (DUR_SWITCH). All other con-
trol variables are as previously defined. The Cox
proportional hazards model enables the determi-
nation of the length of time it takes for firms to
switch from DB to DC pension plans. Compared
with other parametric models (such as Weibull
and exponential), the Cox model (which is a semi-
parametric model) does not impose any structure
on the baseline hazard and may result in more ac-
curate estimations. Therefore, DUR_SWITCH is
used to measure the duration of switches from DB
to DC pension plans. Each firm is assumed to have
a probability of switching from aDBpension plan,
called the hazard rate. The coefficients and haz-
ard ratios are reported in Table 6. A significant
positive value of the β parameter indicates that
an increase in the corresponding variables leads to
faster switching from DB pension plans. The haz-
ard rate is interpreted as the extent to which the
hazard of the event increases for a unit change
in the independent variables. A hazard rate larger
than 1 suggests that the corresponding variable is
negatively associated with the length of survival,
whereas a hazard rate of between 0 and 1 suggests
a positive association.
In Table 6, columns (1) and (2) show a nega-
tive and significant coefficient of SIZE_BOARD
at the 10% significance level, and a hazard ratio
between 0 and 1. This suggests that firms with a
larger board are slower to switch from DB to DC
pension plans. These results support H1b, and are
consistent with previous studies (Choy, Lin and
Officer, 2014; McFarland, Pang and Warshawsky,
2009). Choy, Lin and Officer (2014) find that firms
which switch from DB pension plans are more
likely to experience increased firm risk as man-
agers are incentivized to take more risk when pen-
sion obligations are reduced. Therefore, given that
larger boards favour less risk-taking (Cheng, 2008;
Pathan, 2009; Wang, 2012), firms with a larger
board are associated with slower switching from
DB pension plans in order to prevent managers
from increasing firm risk. In addition, boards of
directors may worry about the negative impact
of switching on employees (McFarland, Pang and
Warshawsky, 2009) and the increased costs of pro-
viding DB pension plans for existing employees,
as fewer young employees will contribute. This
may support stakeholder theory, in that firms with
larger boards protect employees’ benefits and are
slower to switch from DB to DC pension plans.
However, there is no evidence of a signif-
icant relationship between BOARD_IND and
DUR_SWITCH. This rejects H2b. Our evidence
differs from that of Vafeas and Vlittis (2018), who
find that firms with more independent directors
are more likely to switch from DB to DC pen-
sion plans. They suggest that independent direc-
tors’ interests are aligned with those of sharehold-
ers, believing that switching from DB to DC pen-
sion plansmay decease firms’ costs. However, there
are institutional differences between UK and US
pension plans. UK pension trustees play a signif-
icant role in pension decision-making, and firms
must consult with pension trustees when deciding
on significant changes to pension plans. Therefore,
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 6. The impact of board composition on switches of DB pension plans
hi(DUR_SWITCH ) = h0(t)exp {β0 + β1SIZE_BOARDi,t + β2BOARD_INDi,t + β3PCT_FEMALEi,t
+ β4ROAi,t + β5LEVi,t + β6OP_CFi,t + β7DIV_PAYOUTi,t + β8SIZEi,t + β9PLAN_SIZEi,t + β10FUNDi,t
+ ∑ βrIndustry_dummy+ σ }
Dependent variable DUR_SWITCH
Full and partial switches Partial switches Full switches
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Coefficient Hazard ratio Coefficient Hazard ratio Coefficient Hazard ratio
SIZE_BOARD −0.810* 0.445* −0.162 0.850 −0.918* 0.399*
(0.4610) (0.2050) (0.7660) (0.6510) (0.5520) (0.2200)
BOARD_IND −0.007 0.993 −0.020 0.980 −0.006 0.994
(0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0164) (0.0161) (0.0105) (0.0105)
PCT_FEMALE 0.016 1.016 0.0009 1.001 0.022* 1.022*
(0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0126) (0.0129)
ROA 0.013 1.013 0.0134 1.013 0.000233 1.000
(0.0167) (0.0169) (0.0387) (0.0392) (0.0174) (0.0174)
LEV 0.096 1.100 −0.394 0.674 0.528 1.695
(0.5050) (0.5560) (1.3070) (0.8810) (0.5470) (0.9280)
OP_CF −0.010 0.990 0.058 1.059 0.077 1.080
(0.1440) (0.1430) (0.2110) (0.2230) (0.1780) (0.1920)
DIV_PAYOUT 2.04e−05 1.000 0.002 1.002 7.00e−05 1.000
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0011)
SIZE 0.104 1.110 0.273* 1.314* −0.036 0.964
(0.0872) (0.0968) (0.1590) (0.2090) (0.1030) (0.0993)
PLAN_SIZE 0.468** 1.597** 1.233** 3.432** 0.196 1.217
(0.2240) (0.3580) (0.5110) (1.7550) (0.2460) (0.3000)
FUND 0.004 1.004 −0.0003 1.000 0.004 1.004
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0065) (0.0065)
Industry dummy YES YES YES
Observations 1,669 1,979 1,857
Number of firms 291 291 291
Number of firms to switch 123 38 93
Wald chi-square 30.78 20.95 22.69
Note: This table reports the results of survival analysis for the impact of board composition on switch decisions of DB pension plans.
The dependent variable is the time in years to switch DB to DC pension plans. Columns (3) and (5) report the survival analysis for
partial switches and full switches independently. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the coefficient results. Columns (2), (4) and (6) report
the hazard ratios. The positive coefficient indicates that as the independent variables increase, the time-to-event decreases (event is
faster to happen). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively (two-tailed). Standard errors clustered by firm. All variable definitions are reported in Appendix B.
pension trustees’ roles may mitigate the influence
of independent directors on decisions to switch
from DB to DC pension plans. In addition, as dis-
cussed earlier, IGCs may play a role in pension
investment policy when firms decide to close DB
pension plans.
Our results reveal the differing impacts of board
independence on two pension de-risking strategies
(pension asset allocations and switches fromDB to
DC pension plans). Independent directors appear
to have a significant influence on pension asset al-
locations, but no or less influence on switching de-
cisions. This may be because the latter significantly
affect employees’ benefits and may attract greater
attention from pension trustees and independent
committees. This may be more likely to mitigate
independent directors’ influence on switching than
on pension asset allocations. We find no evidence
for the impact of the percentage of female direc-
tors on boards (PCT_FEMALE) on switches from
DB to DC pension plans.
Full and partial switches have differing impacts
on pension beneficiaries. Partial switches only
impact on new employees, whereas full switches
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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impact on all employees. Therefore, we con-
duct further survival analysis focusing on the
separate impacts of board compositions on
partial switches (columns (3) and (4) of Ta-
ble 6) and full switches (columns (5) and (6) of
Table 6).
We find no evidence that the number of direc-
tors (SIZE_BOARD), the percentage of indepen-
dent directors (BOARD_IND) or the percentage
of female directors on boards (PCT_FEMALE)
impact on partial switches from DB to DC pen-
sion plans. However, we find a negative and signif-
icant coefficient of board size (SIZE_BOARD) at
the 10% significance level for full switches, with a
hazard ratio between 0 and 1. This suggests that
larger boards are slower to take such decisions, as
they impact significantly on employees and pen-
sion beneficiaries. We detect a positive and signifi-
cant coefficient for the percentage of female direc-
tors (PCT_FEMALE) on boards at the 10% sig-
nificance level, with a hazard ratio greater than 1.
This suggests that firms with a higher proportion
of female directors on boards are faster to switch
fully from DB to DC pension plans. This supports
H3b and confirms the risk-aversion of female di-
rectors. Thus, firms with more female directors are
encouraged to switch fully fromDB toDCpension
plans.
Overall, our evidence suggests that firms with
larger boards are slower to switch from DB to
DC pension plans. We find no evidence of any
impact of independent directors on switching de-
cisions, as UK pension trustees and other com-
mittees may mitigate independent directors’ influ-
ence. In addition, we highlight that independent di-
rectors’ impact on switches from DB to DC pen-
sion plans differs from pension asset allocations.
This is due to the differing nature of these pension
de-risking strategies, as firms must consult with
pension trustees when planning to switch pension
plans.
Further tests show that the impact of board size
is more significant in full than in partial switching
decisions. This is consistent with the fact that full
switches have amore significant impact on pension
beneficiaries than partial switches (Choy, Lin and
Officer, 2014; Comprix and Muller, 2011); hence,
boards of directors exert more influence over full
switching decisions. Finally, we find that firms with
a higher percentage of female directors are faster
to fully switch from DB pension plans, as more fe-
Table 7. The impact of board composition on pension buy-ins and
buy-outs
hi(DUR_BIO) = h0(t)exp{β0 + β1SIZE_BOARDi,t
+ β2BOARD_INDi,t + β3PCT_FEMALEi,t + β4ROAi,t
+ β5LEVi,t + β6OP_CFi,t + β7DIV_PAYOUTi,t
+ β8SIZEi,t + β9PLAN_SIZEi,t + β10FUNDi,t
+ ∑ βrIndustry_dummy+ σ }
Dependent variable DUR_BIO
(1) (2)























Number of firms 33
Number of firms to BIO 29
Wald chi-square 28.70
Note: This table reports the survival analysis for the impact of
board composition on the decision of pension buy-ins and buy-
outs. The dependent variable is the time in years to engage in
pension buy-ins and buy-outs. Columns (1) and (2) report the
coefficient and hazard ratios, respectively. The positive coefficient
indicates that as the independent variables increase, the time-to-
event decreases (event is faster to happen). Robust standard er-
rors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent signifi-
cance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). Stan-
dard errors clustered by firm.All variable definitions are reported
in Appendix B.
male directors sitting on boardsmay encourage de-
risking on DB pension plans.
Impact of board composition on pension buy-ins
and buy-outs
This section explores whether board composi-
tion impacts on pension BIO decisions, using the
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Table 8. First and second stage of IV regressions: impact of board composition on pension asset allocations
Dependent variables: EQUITY SIZE_BOARD BOARD_IND PCT_FEMALE
(1) (2) (3) (4)







BMEET −0.104*** 1.102 −1.005
(0.0173) (1.0610) (0.6190)
AMEET 0.068*** 1.744 0.570
(0.0182) (1.0020) (0.5570)
PCTATTEND −0.008*** 0.059 0.081
(0.0014) (0.0850) (0.0517)
LAGPCTFEMALE 0.0001 0.327*** 0.815***
(0.0005) (0.0297) (0.0176)
Control variables YES YES YES YES
Constant 312.0 2.099*** 154.0*** −24.37
(219.0) (0.418) (23.74) (14.80)
Observations 1,455 1,455 1,455 1,455
Shea partial R2 0.0471 0.0040 0.0274
R2/partial R2 −0.168 0.0444 0.0863 0.6405
F(4, 1,435) 16.00 34.19 615.06
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Under-identification 7.326**
Cragg–Donald (CD) Wald F-statistic 2.081
Endogeneity test 12.19***
Note: This table reports the results of first and second-stage 2SLS regression with board composition instrumented in the first stage.
The dependent variable is percentage of pension asset invested in equities (EQUITY) in the second stage. Instrument variables are
discussed in the main text. We report F-statistics of excluded instruments, SW F-statistics for weak instrument tests. We report SW
chi-square for under-identification tests. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance levels
of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). Standard errors clustered by firm. All variable definitions are reported in Appendix B.
following equation:
hi (DUR_BIO) = h0(t)exp{β0
+ β1SIZE_BOARDi,t + β2BOARD_INDi,t
+ β3PCT_FEMALEi,t + β4ROAi,t
+ β5LEVi,t + β6OP_CFi,t
+ β7DIV _PAYOUTi,t + β8SIZEi,t
+ β9PLAN_SIZEi,t + β10FUNDi,t
+
∑
βrIndustry_dummy+ σ } (3)
The dependent variable is the time taken by
firms (in years) from the year of availability of
pension BIOs to the year they engage in them
(DUR_BIO). All other control variables are as pre-
viously defined.
The survival analysis in Table 7 shows a signif-
icant and negative coefficient of PCT_FEMALE
at the 5% significance level (column (1)), with a
hazard ratio lower than 1 (column (2)). This indi-
cates that firms with a higher percentage of female
directors on boards are slower to engage in pen-
sion BIO transactions, supporting H3c. Female
directors’ impact on pension BIO decisions dif-
fers from that on switching decisions. This is ex-
plained by the nature of the two pension de-risking
strategies: pension BIOs require significant up-
front payments of cash premiums, whereas Choy,
Lin and Officer (2014) suggest that switches from
DB to DC pension plans do not incur any imme-
diate costs. Therefore, our evidence indicates that
female directors exert an influence on pension BIO
decisions, but they tend to place greater weight
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Table 9. First and second stage of IV regressions: impact of board composition on switches of DB pension plans
Dependent variables: SWITCH SIZE_BOARD BOARD_IND PCT_FEMALE
(1) (2) (3) (4)







BMEET −0.115*** 0.480 −0.821
(0.0160) (0.9530) (0.5510)
AMEET 0.076*** 2.220* 0.375
(0.0169) (0.9440) (0.5150)
PCTATTEND −0.008*** 0.052 0.074
(0.0013) (0.0768) (0.0474)
LAGPCTFEMALE 0.0002 0.318*** 0.829***
(0.0004) (0.0272) (0.0164)
Control variables YES YES YES YES
Constant −11.490 2.329*** 143.100*** −18.220
(6.9690) (0.3940) (22.0500) (12.2200)
Observations 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846
Shea partial R2 0.0500 0.0039 0.0289
R2/partial R2 −1.553 0.0468 0.0835 0.6524
F(4, 1,826) 20.91 38.96 709.75
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Firm FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Under-identification 6.603**
Cragg–Donald (CD) Wald F-statistic 1.652
Endogeneity test 19.25***
Note: This table reports the results of first and second-stage 2SLS regression with board composition instrumented in the first stage.
The dependent variable is indicator variable (SWITCH) in the second stage, coded as 1 if the firm partially switches from DB to DC
pension plans, 2 if the firm fully switches fromDB to DC pension plans and 0 otherwise. Instrument variables are discussed in the main
text. We report F-statistics of excluded instruments, SW F-statistics for weak instrument tests. We report SW chi-square for under-
identification tests. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively (two-tailed). Standard errors clustered by firm. All variable definitions are reported in Appendix B.
on the significant costs of pension BIOs than
on the benefits of removing or reducing pension
obligations.
Survival analysis shows no support for any
significant relationship among board size, inde-
pendent of boards and the timing of pension
BIOs.
Overall, evidence for the impact of board com-
position on pension BIO decisions shows that
firms with a higher percentage of female directors
are slower to engage in pension BIOs.We highlight
that the costs of pension BIOs are a major concern
for female directors. Female directors’ impact on
pension BIO decisions differs from their impact on
switching decisions owing to the differing nature of
the two pension de-risking strategies.
Robustness checks
We aim to address any endogeneity concerns in
ourmodels. Two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regres-
sion analysis serves as a robustness test to support
the impact of board composition on pension de-
risking strategies. We adopt several instrumental
variables3 for board composition from prior liter-
ature (Boone et al., 2007; Linck, Netter and Yang,
3We selected four instruments that affect board composi-
tion and have no effect on pension de-risking strategies.
In the UK pension setting, pension plans are managed by
pension trustees. Thus, these candidate instruments are
unlikely to affect decisions on pension de-risking strate-
gies. Vafeas (1999) documents that board meeting fre-
quency impacts on board operations and hence on board
composition. Therefore, the number of board meetings,
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 10. First and second stage of IV regressions: impact of board composition on pension buy-ins and buy-outs
Dependent variables: BIO SIZE_BOARD BOARD_IND PCT_FEMALE
(1) (2) (3) (4)







BMEET −0.117*** −0.214 −0.765
(0.0161) (0.9480) (0.5470)
AMEET 0.076*** 2.701** 0.227
(0.0170) (0.9540) (0.5140)
PCTATTEND −0.008*** 0.009 0.073
(0.0013) (0.0755) (0.0467)
LAGPCTFEMALE 0.001 0.301*** 0.837***
(0.0004) (0.0268) (0.0157)
Control variables YES YES YES YES
Constant −0.714* 2.098*** 55.100*** −3.012
(0.3400) (0.1790) (9.8570) (6.0860)
Observations 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846
Shea partial R2 0.0608 0.0110 0.0840
R2/partial R2 −0.884 0.0578 0.0831 0.6662
F(5, 1,833) 20.34 30.77 627.52
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Firm FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Under-identification 19.52***
Cragg–Donald (CD) Wald F-statistic 3.735
Endogeneity test 19.03***
Note: This table reports the results of first and second-stage 2SLS regression with board composition instrumented in the first stage.
The dependent variable is buy-ins and buy-outs (BIO) in the second stage, coded as 1 if the firm engages in BIOs and 0 otherwise.
Instrument variables are discussed in the main text. We report F-statistics of excluded instruments, SWF-statistics for weak instrument
tests. We report SW chi-square for under-identification tests. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent
significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). Standard errors clustered by firm. All variable definitions are reported
in Appendix B.
2008; Vafeas, 1999), including numbers of board
meetings (BMEET), numbers of audit meetings
(AMEET), board meeting attendance rate (PC-
TATTEND) and lag 1 year of percentage female
directors on board (LAGPCTFEMALE).
As shown in Table 8, after controlling for endo-
geneity issues, the results show a significant rela-
tionship between BOARD_IND and EQUITY at
the 1% significance level. This is consistent with the
main results and supports H2a. The significance
number of audit meetings and board meeting attendance
rate may be valid instrumental variables. Boone et al.
(2007) and Linck et al. (2008) employ the lagged value of
board compositions as an instrumental variable. Thus, we
used the lagged value of the percentage of female direc-
tors on board as an instrumental variable.
level is lower for SIZE_BOARD but remains sig-
nificantly negative. This is also consistent with our
main results, and provides evidence that firms with
larger boards are less likely to allocate pension as-
sets to equities.
Table 9 reports the 2SLS regression for the im-
pact of board composition on switches from DB
toDCpension plans. Again, we find a negative and
significant coefficient for SIZE_BOARD, support-
ing the results of the survival analysis.
Table 10 reports the 2SLS regression for the im-
pact of board composition on BIOs.We find a neg-
ative coefficient forPCT_FEMALE at the 10% sig-
nificance level, supporting the results of the sur-
vival analysis.
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
Z. Li and B. Al-Najjar 17
Conclusions
This paper examines the impact of board com-
position on pension de-risking strategies, namely
changes to pension asset allocations, switches from
DB to DC pension plans and pension BIOs. Our
findings suggest that firms with larger boards
and more independent directors tend to allocate
fewer pension assets to equities. These results sup-
port previous findings that larger boards (Pathan,
2009; Wang, 2012) and more independent direc-
tors (Vafeas and Vlittis, 2016) encourage less risk-
taking in pension asset allocations as they aremore
likely to take account of the benefits to their em-
ployees.
The findings suggest that firms with larger
boards are slower to switch from DB to DC pen-
sion plans. This is because boards of directors may
be concerned about the impact of this de-risking
strategy. First, reducing debt-like pension obliga-
tions may incentivize managers to take more risk
and hence increase firm risk (Choy, Lin and Offi-
cer, 2014). Second, it is unclear whether switching
from DB to DC pension plans reduces firms’ over-
all pension risk, as it may impact on employees’
productivity (McFarland, Pang and Warshawsky,
2009) and reduce future contributions to existing
pension funds. Thus, boards of directors consider
the benefits to employees and the potential risk of
switching. Unlike US studies, we find no evidence
of independent directors’ impact on switches from
DB pension plans. We interpret this as being be-
cause UK pension trustees and other committees
may play a role in decisions to switch, mitigating
the impact of independent directors. In addition,
we find that a higher percentage of female direc-
tors is associated with being faster to fully switch
from DB to DC pension plans. This indicates that
female directors tend to encourage full switching
to reduce the pension risk, and is consistent with
female directors’ risk-aversion.
Further evidence shows that firms with a higher
percentage of female directors are slower to en-
gage in pension BIO transactions. This may be
because female directors are concerned with the
significant up-front insurance premiums necessary
for this pension de-risking strategy.
The main empirical implication of this research
is that larger boards and greater board indepen-
dence should be established to encourage less risk-
taking in pension investments in the UK. This is
consistent with the FCA’s requirement for firms
to establish ICGs in the interests of pension ben-
eficiaries. Greater independence in pension fund
management may reduce firms’ influence over pen-
sion policy-making, and may grant pension bene-
ficiaries greater protection. Our study of the UK
pension setting allowed us to examine the impact
of board composition on different pension de-
risking strategies, and will help to address the im-
portance of such settings in other countries.
Some limitations of this research should be
noted. It focused only on three main pension de-
risking strategies. So, future research might exam-
ine other de-risking strategies. In addition, our re-
search is limited by the availability of pensions
data. Pension de-risking decisions may also be
influenced by pension fund investment consul-
tants. The CMA (2017) has recently investigated
the disproportionate power of investment consul-
tants over trustee strategic decision-making. Fu-
ture studies may want to incorporate the role of
consultants into decisions on pension de-risking
strategies.
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